Introduction: I wrote this essay many years ago--in 2001, as a matter of fact (gah, how the years go by!). I had made it available online, also many years ago, and it received what I'd consider to be some
small degree of exposure. However, due to circumstances a few years ago I had to cancel the service where the paper was being hosted, so it has, until now, been unavailable online. As a result of some friendly exchange with a couple people--one in particular expressing interest in reading--I have decided to again make this essay available online. Thanks to those two people (you know who you are) for the motivation!
I'd also like to add that there was a bit of, er, "tom foolery," let's say, with regards to formatting the image placement that required digging into the HTML, which is not necessarily my specialty--more like not at all my specialty. It looks fine in the preview, but if the reader should find the images display in less than a tidy manner, well, blame that on my lack of coding skills. If there are problems in this regard, I hope it doesn't detract from the presentation too much.
So, without further explanations, I offer for your perusal:
The Fractal Structure of a Dispositional Universe
by
b.e. hydomako
There is no thing that exists which is not contained within the
structure of the universe: a thing which exists must necessarily be
extended in space-time. It does not make any sense to talk of a thing
existing without it occupying a location of space during an interval of
time1.
Thus, all things that are exist as part of the universe. However, we do
not really know how space-time is structured; that is, we only know the
order of the universe as it is received through our senses and then
interpreted by our minds. This situation leads us to believe that
reality is made up of various levels. We have the sub-atomic, the
atomic, the chemical, the molecular, the biological, and the
psychological-the order of the universe appears to us as if it is some
sort of pyramid scheme! This way of dividing up the world leads directly
to complication.
We become puzzled as to how the levels interact, and as to how specific
systems in one level work to influence systems of another level. "Where
is the work done," we ask, "do the micro-systems supervene on the
macro-systems, or vice-versa?" We are led to asking all sorts of
questions like this, and they do not appear to have definite answers.
This is simply because interpreting the world as divided up into levels
is a dead-end, a dry well. However, there is a way of looking at the
universe's structure that is a well spring-the view dissolves or
resolves these sorts of questions (and others). A better way of seeing
the world is not as divided up into levels, but as realizing that the
whole of the universe manifests on one level-the base-and one level
only. Such a notion is found in CB Martin's dispositional ontology. We
will use his theory in this examination in order to understand that
all of the apparently discrete things in the universe are actually a
complex whole which has its manifestation within the boundaries of a
base level: we will come to see that a fractal model best describes the
structure of the dispositional universe, and this will allow us to
clearly see that the work of the universe takes place within the only
existing level of reality.
To begin we will look at our current notions regarding the various
levels of reality. The goal is to arrive at an understanding of how the
various levels we see are actually all part of the same level. It is
important that we recognize that the purpose here will not be confined
to illustrating only that the parts we see are of a whole (indeed, some
of us who agree with the current division of the world into levels would
also assent to the fact that the levels work together to produce a
whole). The task here will be to understand that, as there is only one
level to reality's manifestation, the work that appears as divided (e.g.
that the interactions which occur on a chemical level work to produce
actions on a biological level) is not divided at all; that is, there is
no division of labour into these artificially constructed levels: there
are only partnerings of dispositions which are
identical to manifestings, and all of this occurs within the same
level-the level within which reality finds its various expressions.
As humans we have developed tools and skills which allow us to delve
into reality in a manner which goes deeper than the macro-systems which
commonly and readily manifest in conjunction with us. Examining what is
generally thought to be the smallest level of reality we have the
discipline of physics. This way of assessing the "deep structure" of the
world around us leads to two of the initial levels in the pyramid
scheme model: the sub-atomic and the atomic. These two levels of reality
are often asserted to be the foundation upon which further more complex
structures are built. We can suppose that the pictures of these levels
of reality look like the illustrations A and B respectively2.
Notice that in A and B the picture appears as unique: there is nothing
in A to suggest that it is the same as B; that is, in both A and B we
see
that each picture seems to imply that the two levels of reality are
somehow separate from each other in that their constituents appear as
different from each other. It is important to recognize that while A and
B are not meant to adequately capture the real picture of the atomic
and sub-atomic domains the differences in the illustrations do reflect
the fact that we perceive the levels as qualitatively distinct-we
experience the qualia of one domain as different from the qualia of the other.
 |
Illustration A. |
 |
Illustration C. |
 |
Illustration B. |
To carry this further we will now refer to illustration C which will
stand in for the next level which is the domain of chemistry. In this
level we commonly think that interactions in the previous two levels of A
and B have worked to produce complex systems which are in turn
differentiated from the systems found in the levels which A and B
represent. Again, we see that the picture of reality on this level is
somehow unique and separate from the two previous pictures. We feel that
the chemical level then follows rules which are distinct to this
domain, and thus, interact in ways which produce more complex systems of
molecules (pictured in D). These molecules then go on to work to
provide picture E-standing in for the biological level, and then we
get, through interactions within E, the level which the psychologists
study. This level of our cognitive capacities is represented by F.
 |
Illustration D. |
 |
Illustration F. |
 |
Illustration E. |
Each of these pictures represents a unique level of our world with
respect to this analysis of the current popular conception regarding the
workings of our universe. There is cross-level action; that is, the
interactions on one level are seen to spur events on another level-in
this pyramid scheme of a picture we have work being done all over the
place! This does not appear as a sensible way to view the world's
workings. It offers an interpretation where there is wasted energy
through redundant actions betwixt the levels. Martin says of this, "if
you have levels of being which really
be, [and they] do the work
over again, then [we must] provide an account of how there is work to be
done!" (beh 1). This is where our nagging unanswerable questions come
from. We look at this sort of structure and can not help but asking,
"how do the interactions within A work to produce a different
order of interactions within D?" As well, this is what leads us to the
inclination to reduce, say, the cognitive capacities of human beings
down to the mere chemical interactions within our brains. Then there is
the further inclination to reduce the work of the chemicals to mere
atoms swerving in the void. It is clear that once we are on this path we
remove any notion of what it is to be human from our account: atoms
swerving in a void possess
no emotions or anything else remotely
human! As Martin is fond of saying (quoting physicist Richard Feynman),
"We have to have a way of putting it all back together again!" (ibid.).
In other words, the reductionist tale we tell must account for how
things like emotions and colour (a mere two examples of the many kinds
of
qualia) end up occurring in the world when the world itself
seems to be composed of bits of things which do not
partake of these qualities at all. There are many other problems which
come out of our misconceived notions regarding the structure of our
universe, but we are not here to list them
all. We are here to
see that this pyramid scheme of work on multiple levels is a mistaken
way to represent the actual structure and workings of the universe.
In the above we saw that we have the notion that there are various
levels to reality, and we noted (through the illustrations) that each
apparent level looks different, acts different, and produces separate
conceptions of the systems found within the universe. We will now show
that even though these separate pictures of the world appear to be
radically different from each other they are all in fact part and parcel
of the same system; that is, there are not different and unique levels
which stack-up in some fashion in order to produce the world. All of our
perceptions regarding the variety of systems found on different levels
are in fact sub-systems of a singular over-arching system occurring
within one level of being. To understand this in a visual way we will
now look at illustration G.
 |
Illustration G. |
Illustration G (above) is a picture of a mathematical structure called a
fractal. In particular it is a picture of the Mandelbrot set which has
been called, "...a universal object." It has received this title
because, "[s]ets remarkably similar to the Mandelbrot set occur in many
other [fractals]" (Devaney and Keen 77). Due to the fact that the
Mandelbrot fractal seems to be the only set which has this ubiquitous
nature we will use it as the paradigmatic example of the fractal model
which is being asserted as the best conception of the structure of our
universe (this is not to say that the Mandelbrot set is the structure of
the universe, but that the fractal structure of the universe would also
have this same ubiquitous nature-its occurrence would be found in all
the sub-systems within the manifested world).
G illustrates that what has been previously seen as separate and unique
pictures are in fact all parts of the same picture. We can see that
illustrations A, B, C, D, E, and F are all contained within the larger
structure of the Mandelbrot set. Recall though, it is not merely our
goal to see the parts as a complex whole, but to account for why there
is not a division of labour amongst the ill-conceived levels of reality.
In order to understand this we will first take a detour into why the
fractal model fits like a glove to the hand of CB Martin's dispositional
ontology, and we will also come to understand specific qualities of a
fractal structure. It is through the latter that we will arrive at an
account of how the work that occurs within the universe can only occur
within a base level.
Composition
In Martin's theory of dispositions he claims that reality is, "a
composition or constitution of simple/simpler parts..." (Martin 196).
The simplest parts are known as base dispositions, and they are the
smallest dispositions that exist-they are atomic. Martin asserts that
the manifestation of reality occurs as a product of the partnerings of
these base dispositions. This is summed up on page 202, "[c]apacities
are capacities
for (dispositions for) their exercises or
fulfillments (manifestations) under certain conditions (reciprocal
disposition partners)." This is saying that the base dispositions have
the ability to undergo composition with other dispositions, and it is in
this composition that manifestation occurs. It is important to note
here that regardless of whether or not a given disposition has a partner
for a manifestation, it is the dispositions which are real in the sense
that the dispositions are
actual.
The fractal model is also a composition. A typical equation for generating the Mandelbrot set relies on what is known as
limit cases.
Dr. Clifton Cunningham has described limits as, "...a game that
requires two players" (beh 2). In the mathematics of fractals, a given
number (the input) is then compared with another number. If the numbers
"agree" then a limit does exist, and the result of this process gets
mapped within the fractal. If the numbers do not "agree" then there is
no existing limit, and then the point gets mapped outside the boundary
of the fractal
3.
In other words, for any number, the number only gets mapped into the
fractal if it is able to undergo composition with another number.
We see that this is an analogous process to the dispositional account:
the solitary number (like the lone disposition) does not get mapped
within the fractal (has no manifestation) without first partnering with
some other number. In this account we see that the whole of the fractal
picture is manifest through both those things which have partners and
those things which do not. The fractal itself is the structure of the
manifestation occurring through partnerings, and the edge of the fractal
is defined by those things (numbers qua dispositions) which do not have
partnerings. Both the partnered dispositions and the unpartnered
dispositions must be present in order to define the whole: it is
impossible to create the picture without having both the manifest and
the unmanifest.
Iteration
We will now turn our attention to the process by which the universe
becomes manifest under Martin's ontology. In Martin's theory the
partnerings of dispositions are the manifestation
4.
This is summed up in his equation "D + P = M (where D is a disposition,
P is the disposition's reciprocal partner, and M is the manifestation)"
(beh I). The important aspect of this is that for any M the
manifestation itself becomes a
disposition for further
manifestations. Martin says of this on page 207, "...it could be
tempting to treat manifestations as themselves disposition-free, or at
least not to
raise the question of their dispositionality. This
would be a gross error." What we have then, on Martin's account, is an
iterative process. The output of the initial partnerings become the
input for the next occurrence of partnering in
a further mutual manifestation. There is nothing that is novel above and
beyond the dispositional constituents; that is, the dispositions, even
in their partnerings,
never become anything other then more
complex dispositional systems: there is never a manifestation that is
not "...ready to go" (beh 1) for further partnerings.
It should come as no surprise that this is exactly how the generation of
a fractal occurs. When composing a fractal we rely on an iterative
process where, "the result of one cycle... becom[es] the starting point
of the next" (Marshall and Zohar 211). The result that is generated by
plugging in a specific number into the equation of the fractal becomes
the input of the next step in determining the constituents of the given
fractal.
We recognize that what is occurring in the generation of the fractal is
exactly what is going on in Martin's dispositional theory. The output of
the partnerings is a manifestation which is itself the input for the
next potential partnering. The fractal, as noted above, is created by
exactly the same process. We now see that an iterative process of
composition creates both the dispositional universe and the fractal
model.
Deterministic Yet Unpredictable
On Martin's account of the ontology of the universe he asserts that,
ultimately, the universe's construction is completely determined; that
is, the entire universe, when taken as whole and complete-from start to
finish-is completely mapped out and
could not have been any other
way then how it is. However, he does not think, at any one time or over
some length of time, that we can exactly predict which partnerings will
occur for the next manifestation. Martin says, "we can't begin to keep
up with the mutual manifestations-my God!" (beh 1). By this he means
that the interactions of all the dispositions and their partners for the
mutual manifestation of the world are so complex that we don't even
have a chance to consider all the partnerings which occur at any given
moment. This is the epistemic realization that we can't know it all
(ibid.). We are only able to have some useful
(but incomplete) generalizations about what we expect to occur; however,
we can never know with absolute certainty what will manifest next. This
is due to the fact that, "we cannot examine an entity without including
all its interconnections and interrelations with other entities"
(ibid.); in other words, to properly predict the course of the
manifestations we would already have to know everything about every
manifestation that currently
is-this seems well nigh impossible!
The fractal model is, of course, exactly like this as well. The fractal,
in its whole and complete form is entirely deterministic. There is not
one point that occurs inside or outside the fractal which can not be
accounted for by its predecessors. In other words, the entire fractal
can be deconstructed to find with certitude what went where and why.
However, this is not possible from within the system itself; that is,
during the process of the fractal's construction we can not tell, for a
given input, if the result is going to have a limit which exists or not
until the input has been run through the equation of the fractal's
generation. This means that we are unable to predict
a priori whether any given unit undergoes composition or not.
Again, we see a startling and obvious connection between Martin's
dispositional theory and the fractal model: the entire structure in
finished form is absolutely deterministic, but while the structure is
being formed there is no way to exactly predict what will happen next.
As Benoit Mandelbrot puts it, "The notion of [a] deterministic yet
unpredictable [system] is a surprise to most people" (Hall 122).
Self-Similarity5
A key feature of a fractal is the quality of self-similarity. This
concept is best illustrated by Benoit Mandelbrot's example of a
cauliflower. In the video, "Fractals: an Animated Discussion,"
Mandelbrot holds up a sizable cauliflower and asks us to examine its
shape and structure. He then proceeds to break off a chunk of the
cauliflower and then asks us to examine this piece of the whole. He
notes that it looks very much like the original, but only smaller. He
then breaks off another bit from the smaller part of the whole. Again,
we are asked to observe that this even smaller bit looks like the piece
it came from, and that it mirrors the structure of the whole: the point
being that this same sort of self-similarity is an essential aspect of
any fractal.
The Mandelbrot set displays this self-similarity, but as Bodil Branner informs us, "
M
[the Mandelbrot set] contains small copies of itself which in turn
contain smaller copies...ad infinitum...every mini-Mandelbrot set has
its very own pattern of external decorations, every one different from
every other" (Devaney and Keen 76). So it is not an
identical self-similarity, but only a rough self-similarity; however, there is no doubt that the Mandelbrot
is a fractal!
Now in a similar sense, we see that our world has this feature: things
in the world are self-similar, but not strictly identical. We see that
one person exists as a similar system to another, but that does not make
them the same person. The same can be said of birds, houses, trees,
whatever.
There seems to be in our universe this same sort of self-similarity
among its constituents where each complex dispositional system, "...has
its very own pattern of external decorations, every one different from
every other."
Now since the universe on Martin's account is composed out of
dispositions, it is reasonable that we can look to the manifestations
around us and recognize that these complex dispositional systems share
this sort of self-similarity with our paradigmatic example of the
Mandelbrot set. Everything that exists appears to have its unique
pattern in the world, but there is also much that is similar amongst the
differing kinds of expressions.
The Base Level (The Only Level)
It is in this section that we will come to understand why there is not
work being done across levels, but only interactions and interrelations
all happening on one level.
On Martin's account the only work that is being done occurs at the only
level of reality. "What it comes down to," Martin says, "is the
interactions and interrelations amongst the quarks of the base level"
6
(beh 1). From what we have seen of the theory this far we understand
that there can be no other level above and beyond the level in which the
dispositions interact and interrelate. To think otherwise is to think
incorrectly about what is occurring in Martin's dispositional ontology.
We have seen that dispositions partner for mutual manifestation. The
manifestations can become very complex sub-systems of the overall whole,
but simply because they are complex does not somehow bump them up into
another level of being
7. On Martin's account there is the
substratum
of
space-time, and this is where the manifestations take place. Space-time
provides the canvas upon which the manifestations are the paint.
Granted, we may perceive layers of paint, but this is a product of our
interpretation of the manifestations in space-time: the paint of the
dispositions is whole and complete and only ever occurs upon the surface
of one canvas! There are not several canvasses layered one on top the
other (and this
would be a peculiar way to try and paint a picture-with canvasses obscuring the work done on previous canvasses)-it is but a single
substratum on which all manifestations occur.
On the fractal model we have an analogous situation occurring. In the
case of the Mandelbrot, the fractal occurs on the complex plane. This is
a two-dimensional surface. In extending the model to account for the
universe we understand that the fractal which models our world would be
composed in a three dimensional space. The surface (or space) is the
substratum
upon which the creation of the fractal occurs. While it might seem to
some that we could designate the dimensions (i.e., length, width, and
height) as different levels this is merely a semantic mistake: the
dimensions themselves are not levels, but instead they exist together to
form the
singular space in which the fractal finds its
expression over time. In other words, the fractal is contained and
constructed on only one level. All the mathematics that goes into
generating the fractal results in points being mapped into one space and
one space only.
Now from this we find Martin's explanation of the base level not only plausible, but also
mandatory
under the fractal model interpretation. From what we have developed
over the course of justifying that the fractal model fits like a second
skin to Martin's description of the universe-that is, through showing
that the generation and perpetuation of both the fractal and the
dispositional universe is identical-we find that it no longer makes any
sense to think of a division of labour occurring within a hierarchy of
levels. The fractal model illustrates clearly that there is only one
level in which manifestation occurs, and thus, there is only the base
level within which the dispositional universe finds its expression.
One Model and One Object
We have come to understand that a fractal model best captures the
notions contained within CB Martin's dispositional ontology. A result of
this analysis was discovering that Martin is correct in the assertion
that reality plays out within a singular base level. It also appears
that the fractal model can account for much more with respect to the
workings of the dispositional universe
8.
Between the fractal and the non-existing limits, for instance, is a
"crumpled boundary." It is called this because the defining edge of the
fractal is in a constant state of turbulence. Under the dispositional
theory this is likely where we will find true emergence taking place:
the boundary of the fractal is in a perpetual state of novel
manifestation, and this reflects the idea found in Martin's ontology
that new properties can emerge from the
composition of existing dispositions-none of which posses the property
before the partnering. As well, when asked how many things there are in
the universe, Martin responded, "It is a one object universe" (beh 1).
We see this due to the fact that we can not examine any dispositional
system without considering its ties to other dispositional systems. This
creates a vision of reality where there are really only complex
dispositional
sub-systems. These sub-systems all interact
together to produce a singular complex dispositional system which is the
whole of the manifested universe. When we compare this to the fractal
we see more strong evidence to tie the two models together: the fractal
is a complex whole that contains within it an infinite number of
sub-fractals. Under both descriptions we find that we can not help but
take the idea of "the oneness of everything" to heart.
End Notes
1. We realize that this is
controversial to some people when it comes to so-called "mental"
phenomena; however, we recognize, if nothing else, that thoughts, ideas,
and feelings must also have extension in space and time even if we are
unwilling to call such extension "physical."
2. All illustrations in this paper
appear on page 318 of Michael Barnsley's "Fractals Everywhere"; Acadmeic
Press, Inc.; San Diego, CA, USA; 1988.
3. In G the fractal is the black structure. All that is outside this structure are the limits which do not exist.
4. Here we will note that this is
the key feature of Martin's theory which deals with the problems of
causality; however such problems are not the focus of this analysis, and
so, we will not delve into this aspect of Martin's theory here.
5. While self-similarity is key
feature of fractals, it is not a key feature in Martin's dispositional
ontology; however, Martin is not obligated to discuss self-similarity,
but in the case being developed here we have to account for this feature
in the universe. That is to say, if we desire to see the fractal model
as the best model of a dispositional universe, then we have to
illustrate that self-similarity exists in the universe. To provide a
strong and convincing argument for this would be a paper of its own;
thus, the argument here is only a brief sketch of this notion.
6. At this point (since it has not
yet been mentioned) we note that Martin uses the word "quarks" to
designate the atomic dispositions; thus, "quarks" is being used here to
refer to the most basic dispositions.
7. We can see here an analogy
with the archaic notion of the shell model of the atom. It was at one
time supposed that the electrons of a given atom circled the nucleus in
tidy orbits with levels which expanded ever outward from the nucleus. We
now know that this was an overly simplistic way to represent the
workings of the atom. Modern physics declares that the electrons could be
anywhere, and that there are not these neat shells which the electron
gets "bumped into" due to its becoming more or less energetic. In a
similar sense, we find that there are not tidy well-defined levels of
reality that more "energetic" (i.e., complex) dispositional systems get
knocked into. We find that there is only an increasing complexity
contained in one level with respect to both the orbits of electrons and
dispositional systems.
8. It was thought upon initial
conception that this paper would deal in more detail with at least the
idea of how our "readiness lines" (as Martin calls them) work to create a
"dispositional tunnel" through which we interact with the rest of the
fractal system. This would provide an explanation of why we see the
world as divided up when really it is not. Due to spatial limitations
the concept of the dispositional tunnel will have to be reserved for a
later exposition.
Works Cited
beh 1.
Notes from "The Physical and the Mental". Collected during CB Martin's Philosophy 589.45 class at the University of Calgary, Winter semester 2001.
beh 2.
Conversations with a Mathematician. Interviews conducted with Dr. Clifton Cunningham over the course of the Winter Semester of 2001 at the University of Calgary.
Devaney, Robert L. & Keen, Linda, eds.
Chaos and Fractals The Mathematics Behind the Computer Graphics.American Mathematical Society, USA; 1980.
Fractals: an Animated Discussion. Peitgen, H. O., H. Jürgens, D. Saupe, & C. Zahlten. Videocassette. New York: Freeman, 1990.
Hall, Nina, ed.
Exploring Chaos A Guide to the New Science of Disorder. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, USA; 1993
Marshall, Ian & Zohar, Dana.
Who's Affraid of Schrodinger's Cat?. Quill, William Morrow, New York, USA; 1997.
Martin, CB.
On the Need for Properties The Road to Pythagorianism and Back.
Handout for Martin's 589.45 class, reprinted from the original, but
source unknown. Pages numbers correspond to original source.